Executive Summary
Background to the study
This case study forms part of a broader GICHD study on national capacities and residual contamination and is based on both desk-top research and findings from a GICHD mission to Nepal in April - May 2014. The GICHD hired a national consultant to assist with arranging and attending meetings as well as drafting the case study. The research team met with key stakeholders in Kathmandu and Chitwan Districts. A full list of meetings held during that mission is available in Annex I.
The purpose of this report is to document Nepal’s experience of developing national capacities to address residual contamination, and to identify and present good practices and lessons learnt. National capacities and residual contamination study terms of reference are available in Annex II.
Civil War in Nepal
The Maoist insurgency began in 1996 and ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. During the conflict, the Nepal Army (NA) used anti- personnel mines (AP mines), as well as improvised explosive devices (IED), around military installations and infrastructure. They started using mines, reportedly, in 2002, placing an estimated 14,000 AP mines in 53 locations. The army, Armed Police Force (APF) and Nepal Police (NP) also deployed command-detonated IEDs. Difficult and often inaccessible terrain in Nepal would be a complicating factor for subsequent demining activities. Maoists had limited access to commercially-manufactured arms and instead resorted to the manufacture of IEDs. The most common device was a “socket bomb” (improvised hand grenades) crafted from plumbing joints.
Since 2007, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) has acted as the mine action focal point within the Government of Nepal.